In the Approval Participatory Budgeting problem an agent prefers a set of projects $W'$ over $W$ if she approves strictly more projects in $W'$. A set of projects $W$ is in the core, if there is no other set of projects $W'$ and set of agents $K$ that both prefer $W'$ over $W$ and can fund $W'$. It is an open problem whether the core can be empty, even when project costs are uniform. the latter case is known as the multiwinner voting core. We show that in any instance with uniform costs or with at most four projects (and any number of agents), the core is nonempty.

Cost partitioning is a general and principled approach for constructing additive admissible heuristics for state-space search. Cost partitioning approaches for optimal classical planning include optimal cost partitioning, uniform cost partitioning, zero-one cost partitioning, saturated cost partitioning, post-hoc optimization and the canonical heuristic for pattern databases. We compare these algorithms theoretically, showing that saturated cost partitioning dominates greedy zero-one cost partitioning. As a side effect of our analysis, we obtain a new cost partitioning algorithm dominating uniform cost partitioning. We also evaluate these algorithms experimentally on pattern databases, Cartesian abstractions and landmark heuristics, showing that saturated cost partitioning is usually the method of choice on the IPC benchmark suite.